Then, everyones doubts were swept away when a SIGINT intercept from one of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats reported the claim that it had shot down two American planes in the battle area. He is the author of Shadow War: The Secret War in Laos, as well as several short studies on special operations, including The War in Cambodia (Osprey Books, 1988), The War in Laos (Osprey Books, 1989), and Southeast Asian Special Forces (Osprey Books, 1990). This was almost certainly a reaction to the recent 34A raids. The United States Military had three SIGINT stations in the Philippines, one for each of the services, but their combined coverage was less than half of all potential North Vietnamese communications. Speculation about administration motives surrounding the Tonkin Gulf incident itself and the subsequent withholding of key information will probably never cease, but the factual intelligence record that drove those decisions is now clear. The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. No one was hurt and little damage wasdone in the attack, but intercepted cables suggested a second attack might be imminent. Interview, authors with James Hawes, 31 March 1996. Hanoi pointed out what Washington denied: "On July 30, 1964 . "5, In reality there was little actual coordination between 34A and Desoto. The stakes were high because Hanoi had beefed up its southern coastal defenses by adding four new Swatow gunboats at Quang Khe, a naval base 75 miles north of the DMZ, and ten more just to the south at Dong Hoi. PTF-6 took up station at the mouth of the Ron River, lit up the sky with illumination rounds, and fired at the security post. In the meantime, aboard Turner Joy, Captain Herrick ordered an immediate review of the nights actions. Captain John J. Herrick, Commander Destroyer Division 192, embarked in the Maddox, concluded that there would be "possible hostile action." As a result, the ships offshore were able to collect valuable information on North Vietnamese military capabilities. History is who we are and why we are the way we are.. History is a guide to navigation in perilous times. But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. With that false foundation in their minds, the on-scene naval analysts saw the evidence around them as confirmation of the attack they had been warned about. The historian here is obliged to deal with two basic considerations in offering up an accounting: the event itself -- that is, what actually happened there in the waters off North Vietnam in early August 1964; and the uses made of it by President Lyndon Johnson and his administration. Unable to catch the fast South Vietnamese PTFs, the government in Hanoi elected to strike instead at USS Maddox. Then they boarded their boats and headed back to Da Nang.12 These types of patrols had previously been conducted off the coasts of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. One of the great ironies of the Gulf of Tonkin incident for President Johnson is that it was for him, politically, a great success, he continues. Both South Vietnamese and U.S. maritime operators in Da Nang assumed that their raids were the cause of the mounting international crisis, and they never for a moment doubted that the North Vietnamese believed that the raids and the Desoto patrols were one and the same. The original radar contacts dropped off the scope at 2134, but the crews of Maddox and Turner Joy believed they detected two high-speed contacts closing on their position at 44 knots. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. . The secondary mission of the Gulf of Tonkin patrols was to assert American freedom of navigation in international waters. As far as the headlines were concerned, that was it, but the covert campaign continued unabated. By late 1958 it was obvious that a major Communist buildup was underway in South Vietnam, but the American SIGINT community was ill-placed and ill-equipped to deal with it. The errors made in the initial analysis were due to a combination of inexperience, limited knowledge of North Vietnams operations and an operational imperative to ensure that the U.S. Navy ships would not be caught by surprise. On July 31, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox commenced a Desoto patrol off North Vietnam. McNamara was ready to respond. Two days later, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution sailedthrough both houses of Congress by a vote of 504 to 2. ", "No," replied McCone. In Saigon, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor objected to the halt, saying that "it is my conviction that we must resume these operations and continue their pressure on North Vietnam as soon as possible, leaving no impression that we or the South Vietnamese have been deterred from our operations because of the Tonkin Gulf incidents." Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the NSC, 4 August 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m.. 13. Operations Security (OPSEC) concerns and related communications restrictions prevented Maddox and its operational commanders up to the Seventh Fleet from knowing of the commando raid. Subscribe now and never hit a limit. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution The Gulf of Tonkin incident - Vietnam War Here's why he couldn't walk away. PTF-1 and PTF-5 raced toward shore. One element of American assistance to South Vietnam included covert support for South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnams coastal transportation facilities and networks. The three torpedo boats continued through the American barrage and launched their torpedoes at 1516. Moreover, the subsequent review of the evidence exposed the translation and analysis errors that resulted in the reporting of the salvage operation as preparations for a second attack. The North Vietnamese turned for shore with the Maddox in pursuit. Senate investigations in 1968 and 1975 did little to clarify the events or the evidence, lending further credence to the various conspiracy theories. In response, the North Vietnamese built up their naval presence around the offshore islands. The fig leaf of plausible denial served McNamara in this case, but it was scant cover. With this information, back in Washington President Johnson and his advisers considered their options. Keep supporting great journalism by turning off your ad blocker. Conspiracy FACT #8: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - YouTube . Meanwhile, by late August 3, the North Vietnamese had learned the condition of their torpedo boats and ordered a salvage tug to recover the damaged craft. This is not the place to establish the final truth on the Gulf of Tonkin matter and certainly I am not the person to render the ultimate judgment. Johnsonasked for, and received, a resolution of war from the US Congress that led to further escalation in the conflict. Any escalation in the bombing of the North risked provoking the Russians or, more likely, the Chinese. Americas Vietnam War had begun in earnest. 10. The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. Perhaps that is the most enduring lesson from Americas use of SIGINT in the Vietnam War in general and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in particular. In any event, the attack took place in broad daylight under conditions of clear visibility. Gulf of Tonkin incident Facts Forty-five minutes after beginning their attack, the commandos withdrew. In the end the Navy agreed, and in concert with MACV, took steps to ensure that "34A operations will be adjusted to prevent interference" with Desoto patrols.7 This did not mean that MACV did not welcome the information brought back by the Desoto patrols, only that the two missions would not actively support one another. Fluoride. Seventh Fleet reduced it to 12 nautical miles. President, weve just had a report from the commander of that task force out there The report is that they have observed and we don't know by what means two unidentified vessels and three unidentified prop aircraft in the vicinity of the destroyers, McNamara told the president. 11. 14. All missed, probably because the North Vietnamese had fired too soon. But we sure ought to always leave the impression that if you shoot at us, you're going to get hit, Johnson said. They arrived on station overhead by 2100 hours. But the administration dithered, informing the embassy only that "further OPLAN 34A operations should be held off pending review of the situation in Washington. Changing course in time to evade the torpedoes, the Maddox again was attacked, this time by a boat that fired another torpedo and 14.5-mm machine guns. The U.S. ships were supposed to remain well outside North Vietnams claimed five nautical mile territorial limit. Two hours later, Captain Herrick reported the sinking of two enemy patrol boats. He headed seaward hoping to avoid a confrontation until daybreak, then returned to the coast at 1045, this time north of Hon Me. Mr. It reveals what commanders actually knew, what SIGINT analysts believed and the challenges the SIGINT community and its personnel faced in trying to understand and anticipate the aggressive actions of an imaginative, deeply committed and elusive enemy. The North Vietnamese did not react, probably because no South Vietnamese commando operations were underway at that time. 426-436. CIA Director John McCone was convinced that Hanoi was reacting to the raids when it attacked the Maddox. A lesser-known fact is that Jim Morrisons father, Captain George Stephen Morrison, commanded the Carrier Division during the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Case Closed: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - HistoryNet Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. This time the U.S. ships detected electronic signals and acoustic indications of a likely second North Vietnamese naval attack, and they requested U.S. air support. The Maddox was attacked at 1600. This article is based on the PRI podcast, LBJ's War, hosted by David Brown. The Pentagon had already released details of the attack, and administration officials had already promised strong action. Then North Vietnams naval authorities either became confused or were seized by indecision. Aircraft from Ticonderoga arrived on-scene at 1528 hours and fired on the boats. Both orders were repeated, but only the latter was relayed to the torpedo boats before the attack was launched. "14, Nasty fast patrol boats demonstrated their versatility in the Pacific Ocean before going to Vietnam.U.S. Originally begun by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, 34A was a highly-classified program of covert operations against North Vietnam. The Gulf of Tonkin incident: the false flag operation that started the Vietnam war. Something Isnt Working Refresh the page to try again. Something Isnt Working Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident - ThoughtCo The after-action reports from the participants in the Gulf arrived in Washington several hours after the report of the second incident. Gradually, the Navy broadened its role from supply/logistics to aid/advisory -- training Vietnamese and developing the South Vietnamese navy's famed "brown water force," those riverine units operating in the country's matrix of rivers and canals and through the coastal network of islands and archipelagos. Media reporting on the NSA reports assessments sparked a brief rehash of the old arguments about the Gulf of Tonkin. The publicity caused by the Tonkin Gulf incident and the subsequent resolution shifted attention away from covert activities and ended high-level debate over the wisdom of secret operations against North Vietnam. Ogier then opened fire at 1508 hours, when the boats were only six minutes from torpedo range. Just before midnight, the four boats cut their engines. . The "nada notion" -- that nothing happened and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident was the product of inexperienced sonarmen and the overworked imagination of young deck-watch officers -- can no longer be sustained. Hickman, Kennedy. For the maritime part of the covert operation, Nasty-class fast patrol boats were purchased quietly from Norway to lend the illusion that the United States was not involved in the operations. On 6 August, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara told a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees that the North Vietnamese attack on the Maddox was ". There remains some disagreement among historians about the second (Aug. 4) incident, which involved the Maddox and another destroyer, the USS Turner Joy. Forty-eight hours earlier, on Aug. 2, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese boats. Unfortunately, much of the media reporting combined or confused the events of August 2 and 4 into a single incident. The Johnson administration had made the first of several secret diplomatic attempts during the summer of 1964 to convince the North Vietnamese to stop its war on South Vietnam, using the chief Canadian delegate to the ICC, J. Blair Seaborn, to pass the message along to Hanoi. Both of these messages reached Washington shortly after 1400 hours EDT. He spoke out against banning girls education. He also requested air support. . Conspiracy However, planes from the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga (CVA-14) crippled one of the boats and damaged the other two. U.S. and South Vietnamese warships intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and simultaneously shelled: Hon Nieu Island, 4 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province [and] Hon Me Island, 12 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province." "1 Most of these would be shore bombardment. Heavy machine-gun bullets riddled PTF-6, tearing away part of the port bow and wounding four South Vietnamese crewmen, including Lieutenant Son. This is another government conspiracy that's true. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American soldier casualties. Hickman, Kennedy. 15. His assessment of the evidence now raised doubts in his mind about what really had happened. Efforts to communicate with the torpedo boats failed, probably because of language and communications equipment incompatibility. In fact, the United States had been waging a small, secret war against North Vietnam since 1961. Under cover of darkness, four boats (PTF-2, PTF-3, PTF-5, and PTF-6) left Da Nang, racing north up the coast toward the demilitarized zone (DMZ), then angling farther out to sea as they left the safety of South Vietnamese waters.2 About five hours later they neared their objective: the offshore islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu. More important, they did not know the North Vietnamese had begun to react more aggressively to the commando raids. This volume deals only with the former. As it turns out, Adm. Sharp failed to read to the Joint Chiefs the last line of the cable, whichread: Suggest a complete evaluation before any further actions.. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a brief confrontation between United States and North Vietnamese warships, off the coast of northern Vietnam in August 1964. While 34A and the Desoto patrols were independent operations, the latter benefited from the increased signals traffic generated by the attacks of the former. NSA analysts from shore-based stations shared Herricks belief and transmitted an immediate warning to all major Pacific Theater commandsexcept to Herrick and Maddox. Defense Secretary McNamara called the president about the second Phu Bai critic report at approximately 0940 that morning. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." Shortly thereafter, the Phu Bai station intercepted the signal indicating the North Vietnamese intended to conduct a torpedo attack against the enemy. Phu Bai issued a Critic Reportshort for critical message, meaning one that had priority over all other traffic in the communications system to ensure immediate deliveryto all commands, including Maddox. The stage was set. The commander also added the requirement of collecting photographic intelligence of ships and aircraft encountered, as well as weather and hydrographic information. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution - Definition, Cause & Significance It is not NSA's intention to prove or In 1996 Edward Moises book Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War presented the first publicly released concrete evidence that the SIGINT reporting confirmed the August 2 attack, but not the alleged second attack of August 4. In the summer of 1964, President Lyndon Baines Johnson needed a pretext to commit the American people to the already expanding covert war in South East Asia. Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995), pp. It is difficult to imagine that the North Vietnamese could come to any other conclusion than that the 34A and Desoto missions were all part of the same operation. WebMany historians now agree that the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which many believed North Vietnamese ships had attacked American naval forces, may not have occurred in the way it was described at the time. They never intended to attack U.S. forces, and were not even within 100 nautical miles of the U.S. destroyers position at the time of the purported second engagement.. Ships radar detected five patrol boats, which turned out to be P-4 torpedo boats and Swatows. With a presidential election just three months away and Johnson positioning himself as the peace candidate, the administration spoke of American resolve not to react to provocation and to avoid escalation. The departure of the North Vietnamese salvage tug en route to the damaged craft was reported to the American ships as a submarine chaser, not a serious threat but certainly more so than an unarmed seagoing tug. The North Vietnamese believed that, although they had lost one boat, they had deterred an attack on their coast. AIDS Brotherhood Symbology The Illuminati Flame . When the boats reached that point, Maddox fired three warning shots, but the torpedo boats continued inbound at high speed. PTF-1 and PTF-2 were U.S.-built 1950s vintage boats pulled out of mothballs and sent to Vietnam. The ships gunners used the standard 5 mil offset to avoid hitting the boats. AND THERE is the fact of Vietnam's position today. This was granted, and four F-8 Crusaders were vectored towards Maddox's position. The Maddox planned to sail to 16 points along the North Vietnam coast, ranging from the DMZ north to the Chinese border. Holding their vector despite the gunfire, the boats rushed in, pouring 20-mm and 40-mm fire and 57-mm recoilless rifle rounds into their target. To the northwest, though they could not see it in the blackness, was Hon Me; to the southwest lay Hon Nieu. The attack is a signal to us that the North Vietnamese have the will and determination to continue the war." They were nicknamed "gassers" because they burned gasoline rather than diesel fuel. Scattered small-arms sent tracers toward the commandos, but no one was hurt. Lyndon Johnson on August 5, 1964, assertedly in reaction to two In the subsequent exchange of fire, neither American nor North Vietnamese ships inflicted significant damage. However, unlike the good old days when -- as the wizened cynical Frenchmen put it, history was a lie agreed-on -- no longer can governments after the battle simply set down how it went and that is that. Based on this, they launched the political process that led to the wars escalation. Whats not in dispute is the aftermath: A resolution from the Senate Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Vietnam 1964; Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 287; Message CTG72.1 040140Z August 1964 (Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 425). In this case, perception was much more important than reality.10. At 1505, when the torpedo boats had closed within 10,000 yards, in accordance with Captain Herricks orders and as allowed under international law at that time, Maddox fired three warning shots. George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983), p. 18. It was 20 minutes into the new day, 31 July, when PTF-3 and PTF-6, both under the command of Lieutenant Sonconsidered one of the best boat skippers in the covert fleetreached Hon Me and began their run at the shore. Interpretation by historians as to what exactly did and did not occur during those few days in early August 1964 remains so varied that the wonder is that authors Marolda and Fitzgerald were able themselves to settle on the text. (2021, February 16). For the Navys official account stating that both incidents occurred and that 34A and Desoto were "entirely distinct," see Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp. As the torpedo boats continued their high-speed approach, Maddox was ordered to fire warning shots if they closed inside 10,000 yards. Gulf of Tonkin incident, complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two Hanoi at the time denied all, leading to a third interpretation that remains alive today as what might be called the Stockdale thesis. . Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. Four boats, PTF-1, PTF-2 (the American-made patrol boats), PTF-5, and PTF-6 (Nasty boats), were on their way to bombard a North Vietnamese radar installation at Vinh Son and a security post on the banks of the nearby Ron River, both about 90 miles north of the DMZ. He is the author of. In late 2007, that information was finally made public when an official National Security Agency (NSA) history of signals intelligence (SIGINT) in Vietnam, written in 2002, was released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. That night and morning, while cruising in heavy weather, the ships received radar, radio, and sonar reports that signaled another North Vietnamese attack. They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam. It still is not clear whether the order was intended to halt the attack or to delay it until after nightfall, when there was a much greater chance for success. This along with flawed signals intelligence from the National Security Agency led Johnson to order retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam. On 3 August, the CIA confirmed that "Hanois naval units have displayed increasing sensitivity to U.S. and South Vietnamese naval activity in the Gulf of Tonkin during the past several months. This is another government conspiracy that's true. Send the First Troops to Vietnam? PTF-2 had mechanical troubles and had to turn back, but the other boats made it to their rendezvous point off the coast from Vinh Son. A long-standing program, the Desoto patrols consisted of American warships cruising in international waters to conduct electronic surveillance operations. HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 25,000 articles originally published in our nine magazines. Badly damaged, the boat limped home. That night, on national television, Johnson addressedthe American people, saying,Renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to take action and reply. Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese boats continued to close in at the rate of 400 yards per minute. We still seek no wider war.. William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part II, 1961-1964, pp. Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. The U.S. in-theater SIGINT assets were limited, as was the number of Vietnamese linguists.
gulf of tonkin conspiracy